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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
DENNIS J. HARVEY by his 
guardian ad litem, Charles 
R. Harvey, 
Plain tiff-A pellan t 
vs. 
DEAN J. HADFIELD, d/b/a 
HADFIELD'S 
Defendant-Respondent 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
No. 9597 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by a minor through his guardian ad 
litem to disaffirm a contract entered into during his 
minority. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment in 
quasi-specific performance for the defendant the plain-
tiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment and a judg-
ment in his favor as a matter of law. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
THE FACTS 
The plaintiff became 19 years of age on the 13th day 
of October, 1959. He was going to college in Logan and 
his parents were living in Blanding. He quit school and 
commenced working for wages in Brigham City about 
the 15th day of October, but continued to live at the 
same location that he had lived at while attending school. 
He had lived with his parents at all times previous ex-
cept while attending college and was partially supported 
by them while in school. In the latter part of October 
the Plaintiff went to defendants business establishment 
looking for a trailer house which he wanted for his 
contemplated marriage and had a conversation with the 
defendent \vith regard to a particular trailer. Plaintiff 
informed defendant that he was a minor and 19 years of 
age. Defendant told him that he would have to have 
his father's signature to get financing through defendant. 
Plaintiff told defendant he thought he could arrange fi-
nancing else\Yhere, and that he had enough money to 
give the defendant $1,000.00 as a down payn1ent but that 
it would take him son1e time to get it. The plaintiff ob-
tained the first $500.00 and paid it to the defendant on 
Novemher 6th as evidenred hy Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3, 
and paid the .other $500.00 to the defendant on the 13th 
of Nove1nher, as evidenced hy plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4. 
The defendant had not obtained financing at the time of 
this last payu1ent and "Tent to the Fir~t National Bank 
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3 
of Logan in an attempt to finance. He signed a finan-
<'ing contraet at the bank (plaintiffs Exhibit No.1) which 
the bank finally refused to accept because of the de-
fendants minority and because his father would not 
sign \\·ith him. The trailer house was placed by defendant 
on a lot in defendants trailer court adjacent to the sales 
office and the plaintiff was credited with 2 months free 
rent. Prior to the placement on the lot the plaintiff was 
given a key to the trailer so he could put shelves in the 
unit, which he did, but the defendant never lived in the 
unit and the utilities were never cornpletely hooked up. 
The plaintiff was informed by the bank that they 
would not finance without his father's signature and he 
took the contract with him to Blanding over the Thanks-
giving holidays and discussed the matter with his father 
for the first time. His father refu.sed to sign the contract 
and instructed the plaintiff to get his money back. The 
plaintiff returned to Logan and informed the defendant 
that he could not get his father to sign with him and de-
manded his money back. The defendant told plaintiff 
that he didn't have the money any more and couldn't 
return it. The plaintiff told defendant that his plans 
had changed and that he might want a trailer in the 
spring and asked the defendant to sign a statement that 
he would give plaintiff his money back plus interest or 
credit on another trailer in the spring. The defendant re-
fused to sign .such a statement but dictated plaintiffs 
Exhibit X o. 2, "·hich the plaintiff typed and both parties 
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signed. This statement gave plaintiff $1,000 credit plus 
interest on the purchase of a trailer of his choice and re-
leased the trailer in question for sale by defendants. Pur-
suant to the provisions of Exhibit No. 2 the defendant 
sold the trailer to another party. Shortly after the 1st of 
February 1960 the defendant received the letter marked 
plaintiffs Exhibit No. 7, disaffirming the contract under 
which the defendant held plaintiffs $1,000.00. The plain-
tiff married in the late spring and set up his residence in 
Arizona. This action was commenced on June 16, 1960 
for the recovery of the money plus interest. 
POINT NO.1: THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
(FINDING NO. 6) THAT THE PR0,7ISIONS OF 
SECTION 15-2-3 U.C.A. 1953 ARE APPLICABLE 
TO THIS CASE AND PREVENT AND ESTOP 
PLAINTIFF FROM DISAFFIRMING THE CON-
TRACT. 
The record reveals that the defendant in fact knew at 
all times during the negotiations and transaction in 
quetion that the plaintiff was a minor. The testimony 
of the Plaintiff (page 92 of Record, line 22.) and that 
of the defendant (page 46 lines 10-22) n1akes it unques-
tionable that the defendant wa.s clearly inforn1ed by 
plaintiff of his age and status as a 1ninor. In fact, the 
defendant told plaintiff he 'vuold have to make other 
arrangementE' for his financing unless he could get an 
adult to sign "'"ith him (page 46-20 to 25). 
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Seetion 15-2-3 r·.c .. A. reads a~ follows: 
''Limitation on right to disaffirm.-- No contract 
can be thus disaffir1ned in cases where, on ac-
count of the~ minor's own misrepresentations as 
to his 1najority or from his having engaged in 
business as an adult, the other part!~ had good 
reason to believe the minor capable of contract-
ing." 
Under this stature if the person dealing \vith the minor 
is informed directly by the minor of his age there can be 
no estoppel, and the above cited section has no applica-
tion. This conclusion was reached in numerous decisions 
dealing with identical statutes, and there are no decis-
ions to the contrary. This is a well settled and firmly 
established principle. In the case of ~rcClure ~rotor Co. 
v. Irwin, 21 P 2nd 403 a statutory estoppel provision 
identical to the Utah Statute was construed by the Kan-
~a~ court in the following language: 
"Notwithstanding there was evidence that 
Harold Irwin had been engaged in business for 
himself, it was clearly shown that when he pur-
chased the cars from the plaintiff he not only did 
not misrepresent his age, he affirmativly showed 
he \vas a minor, and with that knowledge at hand 
the plaintiff knew that he was not legally capable 
of contracting; that the only wa!~ he could be 
legally capable of contracting \vould be through 
having his rights of majority conferred upon him, 
and no one claims that was done, or, if it \vas 
done, the burden was on the plaintiff to sho\v it. 
The plaintiff, aware of the fact that the defendant 
\\~as a minor, dealt with him and kne\v as a minor 
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he had a right to disaffirm, which he did in a 
somewhat belated manner. Under the circun1-
stances, it cannot be said, as a 1natter of law, that 
the plaintiff had good reason to believe the minor 
capable of contracting; The converse is true that~ 
when plaintiff knew of defendant's minority, it 
could have no good reason to believe him cabable 
of contracting.'' 
Similarly, in Snodderly v. Brotherton, 21 P 2nd 1036 
the Washington court reached the same result in con-
struing an identical estopple statute: 
''It will be noted from a reading of this sec-
tion of the statute that, in order to prevent dis-
affirmance, there must be either an actual mi~­
representation of age by the minor, or else an 
implied misrepresentation arising from his hav-
ing engaged in business, whereby the other party 
has good reason to believe him to be capable of 
contracting. There is not a syliable of testi1nony 
nor a shred of evidence in the record that re-
spondent actually misrepresented his age. ,,,._ P n1ay 
therefore disregard that element. ,,~hether re-
spondent's former business activities and enter-
prises were such as to lead one generally to be-
lieve hin1 capable of contracting~ is inunaterial 
in this case because the court in its memoranum 
opinion and also in its finding of fart, specifically 
found that Stradley, the agent of appellant knew 
that respondent \\Tas not then of age.'' 
It is clear from these decisions that \\'"here the minor 
informs the person \Yith \Yhoin he deals that he i.:; a Injnor 
the provision~ of said P~toppel statute do not apply, and 
P~peciall~· \\·here the defendant told the plaintiff that he 
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could not finance him on the balance because of his minor-
ity, thus acknowledging that he knew that the defendants 
eaparity to contract was limited. 
I quote from defendant's testimony as follows (P. 46 
lines 10-22). 
Q. Was there any discussion during any of 
these conversations concerning the age of Dennis 
Harvey~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was the nature of the conversv.tion 
as it related to the age of Dennis Harvey; ar~d if 
you recall the general sequence of the conver-
sations, was it in the early part of your discus-
sions with him or the latter part of your discus-
sions with him that the matter of age came up~ 
A. I say the earlier part. 
Q. What was said between you as regards the 
matter of age~ 
A. Well, he told me his age. I think it was nine-
teen, nineteen or twenty. At least I know he was 
under 21, and I told him there would be a problem 
of financing. 
The record is replete with acknowledgments by the 
defendant that he knew the plaintiff was a minor at all 
times. 
In view of the above discussion it is irrelevent as to 
"'"hether or not the defendant was ''engaged in business 
as an adult" within the maining of the statute in ques-
tion; however, even if it were to be determined to be 
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relevant the court made no finding of fact which would 
justify such a conclusion, nor would such a finding have 
been warranted by the evidence if it had been made. rrhe 
type of evidence necessary to .;.;ustain such a finding is 
discussed in the leading case of Friar v. Rae - Chandler 
Co. 185 N. W. 32, (Iowa), construing a substantially 
Rimilar estoppel statute from which I quote as follo,vs: 
The words ''engaging in business'' within the 
meaning of section 3190 of the Code are difficult 
to precise definition. They certainly mean some-
thing more than working for wages upon a farm 
or in a factory or as a chauffer or clerking in 
a store and many similar occupations. These em-
ployments are as common to minors as to adults, 
and there is nothing in the nature or character 
thereof to indicate that a minor thus employed 
is engaged in business as an adult. These occu-
pations are not peculiar to adults. . . . . . . . 
One engaged as chauffer, as a laborer, clerk, 
or stock salesman, although upon a commission 
basis, is not engaged in an independent business 
in which he assun1e8 to pay obligations growing 
out of and peculiar to the business. One en-
gaged in busine8~ as an adult makes contract~ 
and a.ssu1nes obligation~ 'Yhich are binding a~ 
a 1natter of course and "~ithout question as to 
his right to do ~o. ', 
There is no evidence of plaintiffs having engaged in 
busines~ as an adult or even having represented that 
he had done business as an adult 'Yithin the 1neaning of 
the statute. The strongP.3t evidence on the point is that 
the plaintiff '· "Tas 'Yorking in Brigham.'' 
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POIN'"f NO.2: THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
(FINDING NO. 5) THAT THERE WAS ANY CON-
TRl\CT TO BE DISAFFIRMED EXCEPT EXHIBIT 
KO. :2. 
For the reasons stated under the discussions on point 
No. 3, the so-called contract or Exhibit No. 1 never was 
executed and never became a contract which left only 
Exhibit No. 2 as a "'contract" . 
..:\ssurning, however, that Exhibit No. 1, were to be 
eons trued as a contract then Exhibit No. 2 constituted 
a novation contract. It extinguished all prior contracts, 
if an~~ existed, pertaining to the conditions of defend-
ants right to retain the $1,000 plus interest. A 
disaffirmance thereof would constitute a complete dis-
affirmance of any agreement under which the defend-
ant claimed to hold the money. 
1..-nder all prior writings and the testimony of both 
the plaintiff and defendant, there had been, prior to 
the (lXerution of No. 2, an understanding concerning the 
purchase of a specific trailer for a specific price. rrhe 
execution of Exhibit 2 completely changed all prior un-
derstanding·~ and the defendant was authorized to sell 
the specific trailer house and the plaintiff was given 
full credit on the defendants books for the $1,000.00 
plus interest and was to select an entirely different 
trailer 6 months later. 
The defendant actually sold the trailer home in ques-
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tion, pursuant to the release contained in Exhibit No. 
2. The court held that even though Exhibit No. 2 
had been executed, that a prior contract pertaining to 
the $1,000.00 which was inconsistant with Exhibit No. 2 
was still in force and effect and needed specific dis-
affirmnace. 
The essentials of a novation as stated in 66 C.J.S. 
p. 683 are as follows: 
''The courts have frequently enumerated the 
essential requisites of a novation as (1) a pre-
viously valid obligation: (2) the extinguishment 
of the old contract; (3) and the validity of a 
new one.'' 
These elements are inherent in this transaction as 
giving validity to Exhibit No. 2 as a complete novation 
contract even if prior writings constituted a contract 
and we deny that any did. Thus, there was only one con-
tract to be disaffirmed, Exhibit No. 2, either upon the 
theory that it was the only contract or upon the theory 
that it was a novation of a previous contract. 
POINT NO. 3: THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
(FINDING NO. 1) THAT EXHIBIT NO. 1 CONSTI-
TUTED A CONDITIONAL SALES CONTR.A.CT EN-
TERED INTO BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DE-
FENDANT AND ERRED IN FINDING THAT PUR-
SUANT TO SAID CONTRACT THE PLAINTIFF 
PAID $1,000.00. 
Exhibit No. 1, both on its face and under the undis-
puted testimony, is no more than an application for 
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finan~ing 111ade to the First National Bank of Logan, 
whieh 'va~ never approved nor accepted by said bank 
hP~ause the plaintiff \\'US a Ininor and could not get his 
fathPr to sign with him. The defendant clearly Btates 
that he could not finance him through any of his 
sources 'vithout the father's signature (Page 53 
lines 1-l:-2;)). The record is quite clear on the point 
that if the bank had accepted the signature of the plain-
tiff alone and disbursed the money to Hadfields unde-r 
the terms of Exhibit No. 1 then it might be said that 
Exhibit No. 1 constituted a contract. Ho,vever, any ef-
fect that might have otherwise been given to~ said exhibit 
as a contract 'vas nullified by the bankB specifically re-
jecting it-plaintiff was unable to get financing. Said 
Exhibit can not be said to be any more than an offer 
to the bank 'vhich offer was specifically rejected by 
the bank according to the undisputed testimony and the 
Courts finding No. 4. If Exhibit No. 1 is to be held to be 
a binding contract between the parties then the de-
fendant should be required to con1e up 'vith the finan-
cing 1noney, but this he specifically refused to do 'vith-
out the fathers signature. The so-called contract wa3 
never seen by defendant until after the bank had re-
fused financing and then the plaintiff showed it to 
him when he told him he wanted his money back. There 
is not one shred of evidence in the record wherein the 
defendant claims exhibit No. 1 to be a contract or that 
he "'a~ 'villing to abide by the terms thereof 'vhich 
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would have entailed his financing the trailer without 
plaintiffs father's signature. In any event exhibit No. 
2 would have constituted a complete novation of Exhib-
it No. 1, or any other prior writing concerning the 
$1,000.00 for the reasons set forth in argument on 
Point No. 2. 
No money was paid pursuant to the terms of Exhibit 
No. 1. Exhibit No. 1 was signed at the bank on the 
24th day of November, 1959 and the money was all 
deposited with the defendant prior thereto in two in-
stallments, of $500.00 each, the first on November 6th, 
(see exhibit 3,) and the second on November 13 (see 
exhibit 4). The record is indisputable that there were 
no specific arrangements made for financing at the 
time of the deposit of the money with the defendant. 
POINT NO. 4: THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
(FINDING NO.5) THAT THE PLAINTIFF NEVER 
DISAFFIRMED THE FIRST CONTRACT AND ER-
RED IN :B,AILING TO FIND AS A ~fATTER OF 
LAW THAT THE PLAINTIFF DISAFFIR:\fED 
ANY CONTRACT UNDER WHICH THE DEFEND-
ANT CLAIMED TO HOLD THE PLAIXTIFF'S 
$1,000.00. 
This court has announced the ground rule as to the 
manner and form required for a disaffirmance of a 
contract by a minor in the case of l\f erchants Credit 
Bureau v. Kaoru Akiyama 230 P. 1017 in which case 
the minor was defending himself against an action on 
a note he had co-signed "Thile a minor but \\Thich action 
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'vas counnenced against hiin after he attained his ma-
jorit~·. In his ans,ver for the first time he raised the 
<lefensP of minorit~· and disaffirmed. In connection 
'vith the Inode of disaffirtnance the court stated as fol-
lows at page 1018: 
It is contended on the part of plaintiff that, 
in vie'v that Kaoru "ras of age when his answer 
was filed, that did not amount to a disaffirm-
ance. We cannot agree with that contention, in 
view of the fact that no particular fornt of dis-
affirmance is necessary, and undoubtedly ~[r. 
Sneddon, as attorney, if not as guardian ad lim-
em, could disaffirm precisely as he did. ~fore­
over, there is nothing in the record to show any 
fact or circumstance 1ohatever from which any 
one could assume that J( aoru intended to b~ 
bo1tnd by the note in question. (Emphasis sup 
plied). 
In the instant case the minor or his guardian have 
taken all of the affirmative steps in causing the letter 
of disaffirmance to be written by their attorneys in 
Southern lTtah (P. Exhibit No. 7), and by the bringing 
of an action to recover the $1,000.00 plus interest on 
the basis of a disaffirmance. To hold otherwise would 
require the most technical of terminology in effecting 
a dissaffirmance. The disaffirmance is sufficiently spec-
ific even under a highly technical construction. 
POINT NO. 5: THE COL'"RT ERRED IN FINDIXG 
(FINDIXG NO. 7) THAT THE DEFEND_._\NT \\T-LL\S 
Ol'"T OF POCKET $1,000.00 BY REASON OF THE 
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PLAINTIFF'S ACTS DUE TO DEPRECIATION 
AND LOSS OF SALE VALUE. 
Under the case of Merchants Credit Bureau v. Kaoru 
Akiyama, 230 P. 2nd 1017, this court laid down the 
rule that where a minor disaffirms, he is not required 
to restore the merchant to his former position, but is 
only required to return that part of his take that still 
remains in his hands. The evidence here shows that de-
fendant took the trailer house back and sold it and gave 
plaintiff credit on his books. Under the rule in the 
above case it is immaterial whether the defendant is 
out of pocket any money in connection with the trans-
action. The only person out of pocket in connection 
with the transaction is the plaintiff and the court clear-
ly recognized the lack of evidence in connection with 
this matter. I quote from line 16 page 143 of the re-
cord as follows: 
COURT: I'll have to make a finding that Mr. 
Hadfield is out of pocket the thousand dollars 
as far as the cash part of it is concerned, by 
reason of the depreciation in the sale value of 
the equipment. In other UJords, the court is 
extending a boon to the defendant. He had a right 
to rescind that. He doe8n 't need to buy a mobile 
home. I'm not conunanding him to buy a mobile 
home. He doesn't need to. I'm not 1nandamusing 
him to buy a ne'v mobile hon1e, but I'm saying 
Hadfield had better allow him a thousand and 
thirty dollars on a ne'Y mobile home if he wants 
to go get one. etc.'' (Emphasis supplied.) 
There is no evidence of any depreciation in the sale 
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value of the mobile home in question, which is attrib-
utable to the plaintiff: nor is it material and in any 
event. The defendant signed a novation contract or a 
contract, himself giving the plaintiff credit for the 
total $1,000.00 plus interest, without any mention of 
any depreciation in sale price. Defendants own test-
imony sho\v~ no offer of purchase from any other par-
ty and in fact shows that business was bad and we can 
conclude that he had more mobile homes than he could 
sell. 
The finding that defendant was out of pocket $1,000.00 
is clearly a ''boon'' to the defendant, which finding is 
totally unsupported hy any evidence. 
POINT NO. 6: THE COURT ERRED IN NOT 
FINDING THAT EACH OF THE ~1:ATERIAL AL-
LEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S C 0 M PLAINT 
'VERE TRU.E AND RENDERING A MONEY Jt'"DG-
1\fENT IN PLAINTIFF'S FA \rOR. 
The court was quite cognizant that the plaintiff's 
allegations were \Yell proven and without dispute, I 
quote fro1n the record as follows: P. 127 of the record 
line 20: 
''So in the light of what I've said . . . and 
it's remarkable how three la\vYers can look at 
a case from three different angles-the court 
finds that each and all the allegations of the 
complaint are true, every one of them. I find 
that the plaintiff was a minor and is a minor. 
I find that the father is the guardian. I find 
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that on or about the fifth day of January, 1960 
the minor entered into a contract with the de-
fendant for the purchase of a trailer house and 
had deposited with the defendant a total sum of 
$1,000.00 to apply on the purchase of any trailer 
from Hadfield prior to 1 May, 1960, which am-
ount was to draw interest in favor of the plain-
tiff at the rate of six per cent. I find that the 
contract was diaaffirmed. 
The court further recognized the error of its decision 
and the fact that it was out of line with the law; I quote 
from page 144 of the record at the top: 
THE COURT: Well, this is a mixed-up de-
cision and it's probably reversible, I invite you 
to appeal. That's all right. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff de-
posited $1,000.00 with defendant which the defendant 
still holds and plaintiff is not estopped to disaffirm 
and effectively disaffirmed any agreement under which 
the $1,000.00 is still held and is entitled to a money 
judgment for the $1,000.00 plus interest against the 
defendant. 
Respectfully submitted 
DAVID R. DAINES 
Attorney for Appellant 
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